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Letter of April 21, 2021, from Craig Scott
to Canadian Judicial Council Review Panel
in Justice David Spiro Proceeding (CJC File 20-0260)
Concerning the Reliability of the University of Toronto Cromwell Report
&
“For the Record”, Cover Note on Letter of April 21, 2021, and on May 20, 2021,
Canadian Judicial Council Disposition
in Justice David Spiro Proceeding (CJC File 20-0260)

Craig Scott1
(April 21, 2021; June 2, 2021)
Cover Note: For the Record
At page 9, the present document reproduces a letter I wrote on April 21, 2021, [emailed and
received on April 22] to a Review Panel of the Canadian Judicial Council in a proceeding (CJC File
20-0260) with respect to the conduct of a judge of the Tax Court of Canada. The letter included
nine appendices; in the present reproduction of the letter, the appendices have been replaced with
hyper-links as all the appendices can now be found online.
Before reproducing the letter, I have written this cover note by way of scene-setting how I came to
write the letter and what followed its submission. I have then added four annexes, noted below in
the footnotes.
**
Complaints to Canadian Judicial Council, September 2020
On September 20, 2020, I joined myself to a complaint filed with the Canadian Judicial Council by
Professor Les Green.2 The complaint concerned revelations of the interference by a yet-to-bepublicly-named judge of the Tax Court of Canada into a University of Toronto Faculty of Law
hiring process for a new director of its International Human Rights Program. Apart from
seconding the Green complaint, my letter focused on media reports that the Canadian Judicial
Council would not act on the complaint because it was insufficient to know that a Tax Court judge
had allegedly engaged in unethical conduct; before they could investigate, a CJC spokesperson
told the media that it needed a name to be supplied by a complainant.
In my September 20, 2021, letter, I explained why, in my view, this was a misreading of the CJC’s
own rules and how those rules appeared to provide for investigative authority to make inquiries
1
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Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto.
My September 20, 2020, letter is Annex A in the present document.

so that the CJC could discover the name and then proceed with further investigation – at least,
investigative authority if the matter made its way past the gatekeeper role played by a CJC official.
I directed that letter to the Chief Justice of Canada, Richard Wagner, as the Chair of the Canadian
Judicial Council primarily because there is no specific provision in the By-laws for a higher body to
overturn a gatekeeping decision (and because I was initially under the mistaken assumption that
Wagner, CJC, also headed up the Judicial Conduct Committee of the CJC). In any event, the oress
was very soon making the name of the judge known, such that Professor Green’s and my
complaints were then sent on to the Judicial Conduct Committee alongside any others that were
received. The judge in question was Justice David Spiro.
The events that led to the compromising conduct of Justice Spiro can be gleaned from the
following “[International Human Rights Program] Director Hiring Controversy: Resource Page” of
the student newspaper of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Ultra Vires.3 In a nutshell, in
September 2020, evidence had emerged that a Tax Court of Canada judge (later revealed to be
Justice Spiro) had received confidential information about the name of a candidate for the
directorship of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law International Human Rights Program and
made at least one call to the University to convey certain concerns related to the academic work
and views of the candidate with respect to international law and Israel/Palestine. The candidate,
Dr. Valentina Azarova, had been recommended by the hiring committee to the Dean of Law and
the Dean had initiated the process to hire her. Shortly after Justice Spiro’s communication to the
University of Toronto (news of which reached the Dean of Law, it would later be confirmed), a
decision was made not to hire Dr. Azarova; immigration and timing issues were later presented by
the University of Toronto as the reason the hiring committee’s recommendation was not acted on.
Review Panel Constituted
Four months after the lodging of complaints, in January 2021 the CJC issued a press release saying
the Judicial Conduct Committee had decided there was sufficient cause to strike a body called a
Review Panel. No complainants were informed of this directly; instead, they learned of the
decision in news reporting. In accordance with CJC practice and the CJC’s interpretation of its own
rules, complainants are only contacted once before a final disposition – namely, by way of a form
email acknowledging receipt of their complaint and indicating the complainant could keep
sending information as he, she or they wish. Thereafter, apart from sending information into a
void, complainants have no opportunity to make submissions of any sort – for example, an
argument in response to any facts that the judge in question may assert to the Review Panel.
Rather, the judge in question has the only right to make submissions; complainants are in the dark
as to what the judge has represented as the facts, his motivations, and so on, and as to what stage a
Review Panel process is at.

At http://ultravires.ca/2020/09/ihrp-director-hiring-controversy-resource-page/. See also:
https://censureuoft.ca/faq/.
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The Cromwell Report
Meanwhile, the University of Toronto had tasked a former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada,
Justice Thomas Cromwell, with compiling a report on the events and reasons for Dr. Azarova’s
non-hire. The Cromwell Report was released on March 15, 2021.4 The uncontested facts set out in
the report were damning with respect to how Justice Spiro came to know about the hiring process
and what led him to contact the University of Toronto; in a nutshell, he was approached by a staff
member of a political advocacy and community organization, the Centre for Israel and Jewish
Affairs [CIJA], and asked to intervene. However, the interpretations of those facts by Mr.
Cromwell exonerated Justice Spiro, portraying him as nothing more than an interested alumnus
simply conveying concerns of how others would react; page 33 of the Cromwell Report refers to
the fact that a “message had been relayed [by Justice Spiro] that the Jewish community would not
be pleased by the Preferred Candidate’s appointment” (my emphasis added).5
It took some time for a fulsome reading and analysis of a long report and a disentangling of its
considerable problems. As a result, it was only by around mid-April that a critical mass of
commentaries was emerging and putting pen to paper to show how unreliable the reasoning in the
report was. By the end of a busy academic term, I had only had the chance to look carefully at the
report myself in mid-April, and came to realize that – given the CJC process’ secrecy and ex parte
nature (i.e. only the judge was involved in the process launched by the complaints) – there was
some likelihood that either Justice Spiro would have pointed to the Cromwell Report’s
minimization of his conduct or the Review Panel might have read it on their own accord anyway,
notwithstanding no opportunity for others to comment.
I was concerned about the effect this third-party (Cromwell Report) view might have on Review
Panel understanding, given the lack of any countervailing submissions from anyone else. Having
written the CJC on April 4 asking for an update on the process in view of the fact I had heard
nothing and having been informed by return email on April 6 that I would be told what had been
decided once it had been decided (basically what I had been told after my letter of complaint of
September 20, 2020), I was now inescapably aware that there was no practice of Review Panels
reaching out to complainants to ask them for their views on factual information as it was being
presented to the panel let alone to ask them if they wished to make submissions on how the facts
(as the complainants viewed them) connect to the ethical duties in the CJC’s Ethical Principles for
Judges.6 Thus, I wrote a short email on April 20 to ask the Registrar to ask the Review Panel if they
would invite me to make submissions as to why the Cromwell Report was unreliable and as to
The Cromwell Report is referred to as Document 1 in my April 21, 2021, letter; there is a hyperlink to the report
in the present version of the letter.
5 See footnote 10 below on the problematic of nature of making, or being understood as making, claims about the
views or feelings of an entire community, especially when it is a judge doing so in an effort to exercise influence
in a politicized way or context.
6 The principles can be found here: https://cjc-ccm.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_judicialconduct_Principles_en.pdf
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how the facts as I understood them from the report led to no other conclusion than a breach of the
judge’s ethical obligations.7
Letter of April 21, 2021, to Review Panel
A day later, on April 21, I had second thoughts about the wisdom of asking for advance
welcoming of a submission. I decided that the chances of the Review Panel actively welcoming a
submission were slim and that, if I waited for a reply to my April 20 request, the chances of the
Review Panel deciding the matter without the benefit of any counter-view on the Cromwell Report
would grow with each passing day. So, I put together the first part of what I would have liked to
submit – namely, an overview of the reasons the Cromwell Report was unreliable, with inclusion
of a range of the written commentaries that showed how problematic the Cromwell Report’s
method and reasoning were. I sent this as the letter of April 21 that is the document reproduced
immediately after this Cover Note. I indicated I still intended to submit the second part of what I
would like to submit, namely, an analysis of how the facts relate to the ethical obligations of the
judge, should I manage to do so before the Review Panel had made its decision.8
Other duties kept me from finalizing this follow-on submission to my letter of April 21, as the
month of May passed.
Canadian Judicial Council Disposition and References to the Cromwell Report
As it turned out, finishing the second part of my submission would have been fruitless: in a letter
dated May 20 (emailed May 21), the CJC informed me that the Spiro case was closed and that my
letter of April 26 had arrived after the Review Panel had already made its determination that
Justice Spiro had committed a “serious error” but not “serious enough to” warrant an Inquiry
Committee (that would be charged with deciding whether he should be removed from the bench).9
The difference between “serious” and, per the CJC By-laws, “serious enough” to lead to an Inquiry
Committee removal proceeding appears to have lined up in the Review Panel’s reasoning with
interpretations with some similarities to the conclusions of the Cromwell Report although, with its
“serious error” conclusion, not going so far as to reproduce Cromwell’s more or less unqualified
absolution of Justice Spiro.
In terms of what the Review Panel found to have been the basic facts of what Justice Spiro did and
how he came to do it, the letter to me states:
Before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro was a member of the Board of

These April 4, 6 and 20 emails are Annex B in this document.
This letter is the document immediately following this cover note.
9 The May 20, 2021, letter from the CJC to me is Annex C in this document.
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Directors at the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA). On September 3, 2020, Justice Spiro
learned from a staff member of CIJA about the appointment or imminent appointment of Dr
Azarova as the Director of IHRP, and of concerns about her academic work and position on
Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territory. Justice Spiro was asked whether he could
approach the Dean of the Faculty to relay these concerns, and if he could determine whether the
appointment had been made.
Justice Spiro declined to approach the Dean of the Faculty as he found it to be inappropriate. He
had made arrangements earlier for a “telephone catch-up” on the following day with an official
from the University. During their conversation, Justice Spiro mentioned the potential
appointment of Dr Azarova as the Director of IHRP and commented about the controversial
nature of this appointment from the perspective of the Jewish community and the potential
damage to the reputation of the University. He sought information about whether the candidate
had been appointed as yet. Justice Spiro did not contact the Dean of the Faculty, and specifically
declined to approach him.10

Following these findings, the Review Panel went on to make the “serious error” appear less
serious. First, it emphasized that Justice Spiro was acting qua alumnus and not qua judge.11 The
As with the earlier quotation from the Cromwell Report (at footnote 5), my emphasis has been added with
respect to the use of “the” in the phrase “the perspective of the Jewish community.” Not “some in the Jewish
community”, not “many in the Jewish community”, “not those in the Jewish community who believe CIJA speaks
for them,” but the Jewish community en masse. Such apparent assumption that one is speaking for an entire
community or has a kind of positional authority to speak for all as if a homogenous one is not just an
unfortunately presumptuous and careless way of speaking – of which we can all be guilty at different times. It
can also be a dangerous linguistic sign of a Manichean way of conceiving of the social world. Referencing
community identities and values in monolithic terms feeds into the kind of us/them dynamics that does not just
foster absolutism and othering vis-à-vis people or groups ‘outside’ the demographic marker of one’s own group:
it also generates toxic claims about who is real or true or loyal to a group by virtue of a given sub-group and its
organizations actively projecting their own interests, experiences and perspectives onto “the” group or
community as a whole. Speaking of “the” community – whether the Jewish community, or the 2SLGBTQ+
community, or the Canadian Catholic community, or any like reference group – may generally be an acceptable
shorthand way of speaking, but only when it is truly clear that one is not actually claiming to speak for everyone
and when there is no danger that the persons to whom you are making representations feel like you expect them
to accept your or your organization’s view as truly the voice of an entire community.
It is problematic enough when social or advocacy organizations engage in discourses that deepen and
seek to tactically mobilize a monolithic approach to identity and voice that is antithetical to diversity within a
community. It is still more problematic when the claimant to positional authority is a judge who must maintain
as much open-mindedness and political impartiality as humanly possible. Whatever affront to judicial integrity is
caused by reinforcing us/them othering as between members of different communities if a judge seeks to use
influence in a context of fraught political relations, it is arguably as serious a politicization when that judge tries
to exert influence in a way that denies the diversity of perspective within “the” very community that they purport
to represent.
10
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“Throughout the years and before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro had been a very engaged

alumnus who supported the Faculty financially and professionally and who had been active in fundraising

Panel then characterizes Justice Spiro as “voicing his concerns about the potential impact of the
appointment and associated controversy on the University and the Faculty” (my emphasis) –
presumably, the serious error that the Panel ruled had occurred – “as opposed to actively
campaigning or lobbying against Dr Azarova’s appointment” (my emphasis) – quite possibly, serious
enough to warrant an Inquiry Committee if the Panel had concluded that is what he had been
doing.12
In accordance with CJC By-laws, the matter had been passed back from the Review Panel to the
Vice-Chair of the CJC’s Judicial Conduct Committee for final disposition. The Vice-Chair decided
that a private expression of concern by him to Justice Spiro sufficed for his “serious error.” In a
single-sentence paragraph, the letter states: “Associate Chief Justice Nielsen has expressed
concerns to Justice Spiro as to his conduct in this matter.”
This measure – if it can be called that – followed on from various observations in the letter’s
narrative that appear to have either helped mitigate the seriousness of the “serious error” or
reduced the need for a more vigorous remedial measure. These include Justice Spiro’s “express[ion
of] remorse”, his “deep[] regrets”, his “acknowledge[ment] that his conduct raised questions about
his commitment to impartiality toward all litigants and counsel who appear before him”, his
“state[ment] he has learned from” his serious error, and the Vice-Chair’s “satisf[action] that Justice
Spiro is acutely aware of his duty to the public, as a judge, to not only ensure he is impartial, but to
be seen as being impartial”. It may be noted that all these verbal and psychological actions –
whether by Justice Spiro or by the Vice-Chair – took place in private; while the fact they occurred
was reported in the letter (and, per below, a public Press Release), their specific content is not
campaigns. For the Review Panel, it was this background as distinct from the judge’s judicial position that
prompted Justice Spiro’s discussion with the official from the University.” There is much to be said about this line
of reasoning. Suffice for now to note with interest how the first sentence starts its own paragraph so as to create a
separation from two paragraphs earlier when the CJC describes how Justice Spiro had been asked by CIJA staff to
intervene. The worrisome result is that the second sentence appears, stunningly, to be saying that he was
“prompted” by his “very engaged alumnus” status to intervene and not (or not also) by having received
confidential information from CIJA and an associated request by CIJA to intervene at the university.
One might very charitably read “this background” in the second sentence to reach back two paragraphs –
leapfrogging the paragraph that describes how he interfered – to include CIJA amongst the prompting causes.
Indeed, CIJA as prompting cause (either alone as the most proximate cause or as co-prompt alongside an
alumnus’ concern for the university’s reputation amongst a social group) is in fact the only rational reading of
what in fact occurred and, indeed, of what the Review Panel itself already said, two paragraphs before, had
occurred. Yet it remains that, in normal compositional English, the antecedent for “this background” would be
taken by readers to be the contents of the sentence before it that started the paragraph, especially since the CIJAas-proximate-cause paragraph is two paragraphs earlier not just one.
I hope that this structuring of reasons by the CJC does simply represent just poor drafting and that the
Review Panel (or the drafter of the letter) did not deliberately wish to promote the idea – for example, for external
quotation by newspapers and the like – that Justice Spiro’s alumnus status was the (sole) proximate cause of his
interference versus simply the opportunity for him to interfere in response to the CIJA information and request.
12 The possible significance of the word “actively” will be left to a later analysis of the CJC’s reasoning.

known and the public itself has not been the direct addressee of any statement (e.g., of remorse or
acceptance of a breach of ethical obligation) by Justice Spiro.
The May 20 letter to me from the CJC paralleled a Press Release of the CJC that had the same
content as my letter, except for two interesting and significant differences. First, the Press Release
states that the Review Panel had, as I had worried, considered the Cromwell Report, without
stating what use had been made or conclusions shaped by it:
In arriving at their conclusions, the Panel reviewed Justice Spiro’s response to the complaints,
various letters of support received, and the report produced by former Justice Thomas
Cromwell for the University of Toronto.13

This Press Release sentence does not appear in the letter to me and may not have appeared in any
letter to any complainant, as it also was not included in the letter dated May 20 sent by the CJC to
Professor Green.
Secondly, the CJC letter had a final paragraph not found in the Press Release and directed to me
(and no other complainant) due to the fact I had sent the April 26 letter to the Review Panel. That
final paragraph stated that my letter had arrived after the Review Panel had ended its
deliberations, explicitly confirmed that in any case a complainant had no right to make a
submission or have one considered by a Review Panel, and that the Vice-Chair had nonetheless
read the letter before closing the case:
On April 22, 2021, you forwarded submissions to the Review Panel concerning your
complaint and the Cromwell Report. On that date, the Review Panel had already made its
determination in this matter. The Review Procedures and the By-laws do not provide an
opportunity for a complainant to make submissions to a Review Panel, and Review Panels do
not seek such submissions. Nevertheless, [Vice-Chair of the Judicial Conduct Committee]
Associate Chief Justice Nielsen commented he did review your submissions of April 22, 2021
when making his decision on the most appropriate way to resolve this complaint.

Just as the Review Panel does not explain what it made of the Cromwell Report, the Vice-Chair of
the Judicial Conduct Committee similarly left unelaborated what difference (if any) my letter made
to his post-Review Panel deliberations.
**
The above is intended primarily as a descriptive record, albeit with some preliminary elements of
commentary on the CJC’s disposition of the Justice Spiro case having made their way into the
The May 21, 2021, CJC Press Release is Annex D in this document. Note another, more minor, difference is that
the Press Release additionally named the heretofore anonymous members of the Review Panel – notwithstanding
my letter of April 21 specifically pointed out fact the Panel members were anonymous and that I thus had to
address my letter to them generally as “the Review Panel” and not by name.
13

narrative here and there (notably in the thoughts found in footnotes 10 and 11). I intend later to
write or co-write other commentaries: on the substantive and procedural dimensions of the CJC’s
decision; and on what lessons this case has for the just-tabled Bill S-5 that seeks to reform aspects
of the process for dealing with complaints about judicial conduct.14

14

See S-5, An act to amend the Judges Act, introduced by Senator Marc Gold and given First Reading on May 25,
2021: https://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&billId=11356136
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Members of Canadian Judicial Council
Review Panel constituted to consider
CJC Complaint File No. 20-0260 (Spiro)
Via Email to Registry
April 21, 2021

Dear Members of CJC File 20-0260 Review Panel,
RE: Follow-on submission pursuant to complaint of September 20, 2020
with respect to the conduct of a Tax Court of Canada judge
Preliminaries
I am writing on my present assumption that Review Panels are not required
to invite submissions from complainants for a file that they are considering.
This assumption arises from the fact that the Canadian Judicial Council
announced that a Review Panel was being constituted on January 11, 2021,
but I have not been contacted about a submission, even as I am one
complainant in CJC File 20-0260 (see letter dated September 20, 2020).
I am writing to you collectively as members of the panel and without
addressing you by name because the names of the Review Panel members
have not been provided to me and I also cannot find them on the CJC
website. As I am not able write to the Panel directly, I am writing through
the Registry.
I wrote yesterday to the Registry to ask the Review Panel to use its
discretion to invite a submission from me; see the attached query dated
April 20, 2021 as the PDF document starting “0-…”. I would prefer to
be invited to make a submission and thus know that the Review Panel is
actively seeking such input, but I now worry that such an invitation may
come too late for my input to assist the Review Panel in making its
decision on whether or not a public inquiry committee should be
established. My worry arises in part from the fact that, after I sent a query
on the status of the complaint on April 4, 2021, a Registry Officer
informed me: “Once the Review Panel has reviewed this matter, Council
will advise you accordingly.” (my emphasis)
As such, and upon reviewing earlier correspondence, I am writing on the
basis of what I now take to have been a generic earlier invitation from the
Registry contained in its September 25, 2020, response to my September
20, 2020, complaint. The Registry noted at that time that, “[i]f you wish to
1

add any information to your complaint file (CJC File: 20-0260), you may
so do by sending your supporting documents to the Canadian Judicial
Council, Ottawa, ON, K1A 0W8 or by e-mail: info@cjc-ccm.ca.” While
this was outside the context of a Review Panel later being formed (almost
four months later), and while it does not specifically make clear that a
Review Panel would look at anything I add to the file, I am trusting this
September 21, 2020, general invitation is sufficient for the Registry to
bring this letter and its attached documents to your immediate attention. I
also trust that the Review Panel will find it essential to consider the letter
and attached documents closely before making any determination as to
whether a public inquiry committee should be formed in the case of CJC
File 20-0260 (Spiro).
To be clear, I intend now to write in two stages: (1) this letter and its
accompanying nine documents; (2) a second letter connecting the dots
between the specific judicial-ethics obligations of a federally appointed
judge and the recital of facts in the report made to the University of
Toronto by former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Hon.
Thomas A. Cromwell. That report is attached as document “1-…”:
Independent Review of the Search Process for the Directorship of the
International Human Rights Program at the University of Toronto,
Faculty of Law (March 15, 2021).
I am sending (1) today in advance of (2) because of my concern that, given
that three months has passed since the formation of a Review Panel was
announced, the Review Panel may be on the cusp of making a decision. As
time may thus be pressing, I wanted at least to get you the materials I
reference in this letter alongside my contextualization of those materials in
the present letter.
Note finally, by way of preliminaries, I am sending each of the nine
referenced documents as separate attachments to this email, alongside the
PDF of this letter as the first attachment. My assumption is that having
each document as a stand-alone document will be most useful, as it can
easily be found by reference to each document number listed below in this
letter. However, in case it is easier for some Panel members to have the
letter and the nine documents all in one PDF, I will also send by way of
separate email a consolidated PDF. So that this letter works both in relation
to the separate attachments and in relation to the consolidated PDF, my
overview of each attached document will also mention in parentheses the
page at which the same document can be found in the consolidated PDF.
The Cromwell Report and Its Value in Relation to a CJC Review
Panel Making Determinations About Justice Spiro’s Conduct
The Cromwell report is a relevant document for what it reveals as
uncontested facts about Justice Spiro’s conduct as regards the U of T hiring
process. These facts should alone, in my view, be enough for the Review
Panel to decide a public inquiry committee is needed.
However, a major problem arises with respect to what the report then does
2

with those uncontested facts in terms of characterizing their meaning and
and effects. The Panel may be presented with arguments that seek to have
the Review Panel in effect adopt the Cromwell report’s surprising
conclusions: that Justice Spiro’s intervention was not (at all) a factor in the
hiring decision at the Faculty of Law and that, indeed, Justice Spiro had not
even attempted to interfere improperly in the hiring process. Of course,
such arguments can acquire purchase only if the report is somehow
authoritative for the work of the Canadian Judicial Council. It is not. The
terms of reference, applicable norms, and the assigned role of Mr.
Cromwell are different from the mandate, norms and role that structures
the Review Panel’s work. I urge the Panel to make its own findings and
apply the specific norms of ethical judicial conduct that it is charged with
upholding, and not allow an inapposite process to steer your own.
That said, you may have been asked to consider the facts as revealed
through, or presented in, that report to assist you in your own fact-finding.
Thus, I turn to the second purpose of this letter, which is to ensure that the
Review Panel is aware that the Cromwell report made choices and used
methodologies that compromise the value of conclusions reached in that
report. The long and short of it is that the Cromwell report purported to
construct a comprehensive and authoritative factual narrative without
resolving disputed facts, including but not limited to consistency,
plausibility and credibility. No fact-finding process, and no inferencedrawing exercise, can lay claim to reliability in the absence of these basic
elements. In addition, other lines of reasoning in the report are not well
sustained, to such an extent that the quality of the overall report has to be
treated with be approached with caution – for example, the manner in
which Justice Spiro’s breach of confidentiality and privacy is not treated as
disqualifying his conduct while whistle-blowing by members of the U of T
Faculty of Law community with the consent of the affected job applicant
somehow gets characterized as an inappropriate affront to confidentiality
and privacy values.
For these reasons, I hope that the Panel will closely consider the attached
seven analyses of the Cromwell report, which demonstrate in detail the
critique outlined in the preceding paragraph. They are attached with the
following numbering scheme, following “0-…” and “1-…” which were
already referenced above (“0” is at p.7 in the consolidated PDF and “1” at
p.9).
“2-…” (p.87 in consolidated PDF) – Letter to U of T President Gertler
of April 20, 2021, by seven U of T Faculty of Law professors (Amon,
Fadel, Katz, Lemmens, MacIntosh, Réaume, and Schneiderman),
wherein they explain, in overview, the problems with the Cromwell report
and the University’s reliance on it. I have highlighted in yellow the
passages that summarize some of the problems directly related to the
conduct of Justice Spiro – whose conduct the Review Panel is measuring
against the code of judicial ethics. I do this so that you can see, in a very
summary form, the kinds of problems that are addressed in more detail in
the subsequent attached documents.
3

“3-…” (p.94 in consolidated PDF) -- “An Analysis of the Cromwell
Report” by Professor Denise Réaume, one of the seven signatories to
letter in “2-…” and an expert on matters of university governance as it
relates to both freedom of expression and academic freedom. There is a
two-page executive summary preceding the full analysis, which fleshes out
aspects addressed in the letter by the seven. It carefully shows clear
problems of evidentiary and normative reasoning in the Cromwell report
that I am concerned that the Review Panel not embrace.
“4-…” (p.109 in consolidated PDF) – “On the Cromwell Report: Spiro
and External Influence”, an analysis by Professor Anver Emon, also
one of the seven signatories of “1…”. Most particularly, this analysis
should be read for how it seeks to demonstrate that, “[c]onsidering the
nexus of private philanthropy at the UofT, CIJA’s express interests in
curtailing the hiring of Azarova, and Spiro’s known connections to both
institutions, Cromwell’s [exculpatory] conclusions [vis-à-vis Spiro] simply
do not make sense.”
“5-…” (p.115 in consolidated PDF) – “Confidentiality and Privacy in
Justice Cromwell’s Report: Uses and Misuses”, an analysis (posted
today) by Professor Ariel Katz, another the seven signatories of “1…”.
This analysis concerns whether the Cromwell report correctly handled
issues of breach of confidentiality and privacy, on multiple fronts. It is
relevant for several reasons. One, Justice Spiro not only intervened in a
manner inappropriate for a judge in contravention of one or more
principles of the code of judicial ethics. He also intervened inappropriately
in a process that he knew or ought to have known was confidential, and
thereby infringed the privacy interests of Dr. Azarova. His
acknowledgement, reported in the Cromwell report, that it would be
inappropriate to directly contact the dean about his objections to Dr.
Azarova only reveals his intention to do indirectly (communicate his
objection to the dean via the advancement office) what he acknowledges he
could not ethically do directly.
Two, Katz argues that the Cromwell report engaged in faulty legal
reasoning on this front; as such, it does give pause to anyone who would
too quickly credit the quality of reasoning in the rest of the report. This is
important given that, for many in the lay world and even some in the legal
world, the basic fact of stature – that he is a former Supreme Court of
Canada judge – can cause people instinctively to assume that his legal
analysis must be irreproachable.
Three, the Cromwell report’s approach to confidentiality in relation to
whistle-blowing participants in the process is of one piece with the other
outcomes of the report. By outcomes, I mean firstly that the report adopted
a methodology whereby he took what the former dean told him to be true
without question – thus axiomatically absolving the former dean from any
errors or faults. And, secondly, the Cromwell report also stepped over into
Canadian Judicial Council territory when it articulated what appears to be
an alumni-donor-opining-even-when-they-are-also-a-judge-in-their-dayjob exception as a permissible form of external activity in relation to
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university hiring – thus exculpating Justice Spiro in advance of the CJC
considering and interpreting its own code of ethics.
Consider these two exculpatory outcomes alongside the outcome on which
Professor Katz focuses: how the Cromwell report appears to have
misinterpreted or, at the very least, strained legal and associated ethical
principles to find fault with the members of the process who sought to
blow the whistle on the Spiro involvement and on what they very
reasonably suspected was an impact on the hiring process.
“6-…” (p.126 in consolidated PDF) – “Bad Times at a Great
University and Its Law School”, an analysis published today by
Professor Richard Moon (Professor of Law, University of Windsor
Faculty of Law) on the website of the Centre for Free Expression of
Ryerson University. Professor Moon is one of Canada’s foremost
authorities on the law of freedom of expression and also freedom of
religion. (He is also, as he states up front, Prof. Macklin’s spouse, and was
a witness to an important conversation). His column provides a useful
chronology of events, including his account of a critical (and disputed)
telephone conversation between the Dean and Prof. Macklin where he was
present. As with the Réaume analysis, it shows up a range of
implausibilities in the Cromwell report’s handling of evidence relevant to
your Spiro file.
It is also helpful in pointing out the Cromwell report’s tendentious
application of the term “illegality” to an independent-contractor contract
under German law – when it is far from clear that this terminology fairly
captures what German lawyers had opined. Professor Moon’s column
furthermore draws attention to a lapse in judgment on the part of Mr.
Cromwell, in deciding to be a speaker at an event of the very organization
that was involved alongside Justice Spiro in their mutual efforts to
influence the hiring process – in the same period during which he was
finalizing his report.

“7-…” (p.132 in consolidated PDF) – Executive Summary of a paper
entitled “Academic Freedom and the Power of University Donors:
Dogs That Don’t Bark and Other Reflections on the Cromwell Report
at the University of Toronto” by a Professor Emeritus of U of T,
Professor Joseph Carens, a widely respected political scientist and
theorist. This is another analysis that comes to similar conclusions about
the Cromwell report’s hard-to-fathom use of evidence and conclusions in
relation to whether or not Justice Spiro “improperly” sought to influence a
hiring process and whether or not Justice Spiro’s inquiries were likely a
factor in the hiring decision. The entire analysis by Professor Carens may
later be provided as an attachment if I manage to provide my second
submission before the Review Panel makes its decision.
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“8-…” (p.135 in consolidated PDF) – “What the IHRP Hiring Scandal
Tells Us About Intersectional Privilege in Canadian Legal
Institutions”, an analysis published by OpinioJuris.org several weeks
ago soon after the Cromwell Report came out by Vincent Wong, who is
presently a PhD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School and who, on moral
grounds, resigned his paid position with the U of T International Human
Rights Law Program – and spoke out, only to be criticized for this by the
report. This is a must-read structural analysis of how exculpation and
condemnation appear to follow lines of societal privilege quite closely. It is
an analysis that also bears reading for its value in urging special attention
to the potential influence of in-group predispositions in contexts of
institutional judging.
***
I end by observing that my criticisms of the Cromwell report are akin to
criticisms of a judgment that does not hold together, as happens even with
judgments penned by leading appellate jurists. I write from a position of
great respect for former Justice Cromwell – who taught me the Law of
Evidence close to 35 years ago and who (I have said far and wide for
decades) was the best classroom teacher I had across all my law degrees.
However, a report written by a person in their capacity as a lawyer is no
different from a judgment written in their former capacity as a judge: if it
suffers from serious flaws, those flaws must be pointed out, regardless of
who has written it.
The Cromwell report is indeed flawed in salient ways, both in its handling
of empirical evidence and in its normative – including legal – reasoning. It
has no authoritative relationship to the mandate and task of the Review
Panel, but to the extent the Panel is inclined to consider it, it would be, in
my respectful opinion, a mistake were the Cromwell report to lead the
Panel to determine that a public inquiry committee is not required with
respect to the conduct of Justice Spiro.
Yours sincerely,

Craig Scott, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School;
Graduate Program Director, Research LLM and PhD
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ANNEX A

Letter from Craig Scott to Canadian Judicial Council

September 20, 2021
Request to proactively seek the name of the subject of
a complaint in accordance with the Canadian Judicial
Council’s Procedures for the Review of Complaints or
Allegations About Federally Appointed Judges

The Right Honourable Richard Wagner, P.C.,
Chief Justice of Canada

in his capacity as Chairperson
of the Canadian Judicial Council,
Canadian Judicial Council
Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0W8
Craig Scott

Via Email
Professor of Law
cscott@osgoode.yorku.ca
Graduate Program
Director, Research
LLM and PhD
Via RESGPA@
Osgoode.yorku.ca
Academic Director,
International &
Transnational Law
Intensive Program
OSGOODE HALL
LAW SCHOOL
4700 Keele St.
Toronto ON
Canada M3J 1P3
Tel 416 736 5030
Fax 416 736 5736
www.osgoode.yorku.ca

September 20, 2020

Dear Chief Justice Wagner,
RE: Request to proactively seek the name of the subject of a complaint in
accordance with the Canadian Judicial Council’s Procedures for the
Review of Complaints or Allegations About Federally Appointed Judges
I write to you in your capacity as Chairperson of the Canadian Judicial
Council (CJC) to ask that you inquire into and reverse, or reconsider, any
decision that may have been made not to consider a complaint filed on
September 17, 2020, by Leslie Green with respect to an as-yet-unnamed
judge of the Tax Court of Canada. I adopt Professor Green’s complaint as
my own for purposes of this letter, so kindly consider his letter
incorporated by reference and me thus also as a “complainant” for
purposes of the CJC procedures.
A report in today’s Globe and Mail by Sean Fine states: “The judicial
council told The Globe it cannot undertake an investigation into a
complaint unless it has the name of the judge in question.” Section 4(c) of
the Procedures for the Review of Complaints or Allegations About
Federally Appointed Judges provides: “If the Executive Director
determines that a matter warrants consideration, the Executive Director
must refer it to the Chairperson…” It is unclear from the report in today’s
Globe whether Professor Green’s letter was filtered out by the Executive
Director without passing it on to you. Therefore, I address the present letter
to you directly and frame the issue as one of a possible reversal by you of
the Executive Director’s decision not to proceed or as one of you
reconsidering your own decision.
The preliminary screening criteria for the Executive Director in section 5
do not include any reference to a judge’s name needing to be known if
enough information has been provided for the CJC to make inquiries in
order to proactively seek out and determine the name, if the rest of the
complaint reveals conduct that presumptively is problematic under the
Judges Act and the Principles of Judicial Ethical Conduct. Section 5 reads
as follows:
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Early Screening Criteria
For the purposes of these Procedures,
the following matters do not warrant
consideration:
(a) complaints that are trivial,
vexatious, made for an improper
purpose, are manifestly without
substance or constitute an abuse of
the complaint process;
(b) complaints that do not involve
conduct; and
(c) any other complaints that are not
in the public interest and the due
administration of justice to consider.
If the Executive Director assumed authority to reject the complaint at this
stage without referring to you, then I am asking for a reversal of that
decision based on the information I ask to be considered later in this letter.
If, on the other hand, the matter was indeed referred to you as Chairperson,
I most respectfully request that you reconsider and change your own
decision. Here I note that section 6 sets out your own screening role:
Screening by Chairperson
The Chairperson must review a
matter referred by the Executive
Director and may
(a) seek additional information from
the complainant;
(b) seek the judge’s comments and
those of their chief justice; or
(c) dismiss the matter if the
Chairperson considers that it does
not warrant further consideration.

Nothing in section 6(a) requires that the name of the judge be known for
“additional information from the complainant” to be sought. The earlier
substantive-jurisdiction clause (section 3) is not phrased in a way that
precludes a proactive role of the Council to determine a judge’s name once
a complaint has brought problematic conduct to the Council’s attention.
Here, we have a complaint about a known but as-yet-unnamed judge of a
court with a very limited number of judges. Section 3.1 reads: “Any
person, including a member of the Council, may make a complaint about a
judge.” It does not say a “named” judge.
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Obviously, I understand that a full investigation of “a judge” requires the
name at some point; indeed, I publicly messaged earlier this week that,
once the name is clear, the CJC would need to investigate (assuming a
complaint is in hand), by which I mean through the interactive roles of the
Chairperson, an investigator and a Panel. Indeed, one cannot get to the
second screening criterion in section 6(b) without that name. However, I
would respectfully suggest that a purposive interpretation of the role of the
CJC (a) in ensuring unethical judicial conduct does not go unaddressed and
(b) in maintaining the integrity of the judiciary should both mean the
Executive Director cannot screen out a complaint solely due to a lack of a
name and that you as Chairperson have full authority to “seek additional
information from the complainant” preliminary to either going on to
section 6(b) – assuming that the complainant has been able to provide
information that allows you to determine the name or make further
inquiries to determine the name – or to section 6(c) to dismiss for lack of a
name at that point.
I would further point out section 9 which, again read purposively, can be
interpreted to allow you as Chairperson to engage an investigator. Section
9 does not require that this investigator only be hired once a judge’s name
is known and appears open to the interpretation that an investigation can be
used within section 6(a) in order to try to determine a name. Section 9
reads:
Information Gathering
9.1 The Chairperson may instruct the
Executive Director to retain an
investigator to gather further
information about a matter and
prepare a report. In that case, the
Executive Director must inform the
judge and their chief justice.

9.2 The investigator is to gather relevant
information. They may conduct
confidential interviews if necessary
and may provide assurances of
confidentiality to those who provide
information.

9.3 Before finalizing the report, the
investigator must provide the judge
with an opportunity to comment on
the information obtained by the
investigator. The judge’s comments
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must be included in the
investigator’s report.
9.4 Where information is obtained in
confidence, the investigator must
include in the report written reasons
for having provided the assurance of
confidentiality.
Section 9.1 refers to gathering information about “a matter”, which is more
than broad enough to include a complaint that there are good grounds to
believe that a judge on a named court (here the Tax Court) has engaged in
inappropriate conduct. This permits, under section 9.2, the investigator to
determine the name of the judge and then, under both sections 9.2 and 9.3,
conduct further investigations and interviews once that name is determined.
Having constituted myself as a complainant in the first paragraph, I now
provide information that would allow you to determine who the Tax Court
judge is. I have reliable and solid reason for believing, including belief
based on the news reports cited in Professor Green’s letter, that the
following persons have first-hand knowledge of the name of the Tax Court
judge and the timing and recipients of one or more communications to the
University of Toronto Faculty of Law in relation to the appointment of the
Director of the International Human Rights Program. If contacted, I
assume that every one of them would feel ethically and possibly legally
obliged to answer the questions of an investigator truthfully, even as they
may, for different reason, have decided not to speak to reveal such
information to journalists. They are:
1. Edward Iacobucci, Dean of Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto
2. Audrey Macklin, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto
3. Alexis Archbold, Assistant Dean, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto
4. Jennifer Lancaster, Assistant Dean (Advancement), Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto
I am quite certain that at least one of these persons would see it as her or
his duty to provide the name if the CJC asked.
Each one of these persons should be approached. I would also suggest that
the Chief Justice of the Tax Court should be consulted in case he has firsthand knowledge from the judge that he or she did indeed seek to influence
an appointment in the way and context alleged. The Chief Justice may
well know which judges have associations with the Faculty of Law of the
University of Toronto, and – out of concern for the reputation and integrity
of the Tax Court – taken the initiative to approach those judges and ask
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them to confirm or deny whether they were involved. He may have
learned, first hand, the name of the relevant judge for this complaint.
I would also indicate that I do not have my own first-person knowledge of
the name of the judge, although I do know the name that is circulating of a
judge who is believed to be the judge. The legal status of a letter to the
CJC and its contents is unclear to me. However, as a matter of absolute or
qualified privilege, I would be in a position to pass on that name to an
investigator, if asked, on the understanding that the investigator or CJC
would not reveal that name publicly until the appropriate moment within
its own procedures. The intent would be for the investigator to then
determine, via one or more of the above persons, if this is indeed the judge.
I include the possibility that the CJC will determine the judge did not
contact the law school and thereby decide not to reveal the name publicly. I
would not reveal the name until it is properly public.
If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours sincerely,

Craig Scott, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School;
Graduate Program Director, Research LLM and PhD

Cc: Norman Sabourin, Executive Director and Senior General Counsel
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ANNEX B

Emails between Craig Scott and Canadian Judicial Council

April 4, 6, and 20

April 20, 2021
Josée Gauthier
Registry Officer /
Greffière
Canadian Judicial Council /
Conseil canadien de la magistrature
Dear Ms. Gauthier,
I am returning to your April 6, 2021, response to my query on the status of Complaint CJC File
20-0260.
Despite being a complainant, I have not heard from the Review Panel to invite a submission.
Unless such an invitation is planned but has not yet been sent, I am assuming this must mean
that CJC procedural rules do not require such an invitation at the Review Panel stage (as
contrasted with a public inquiry committee).
If this is so, I am writing to ask whether the Review Panel will exercise a discretion to receive a
communication from me as one complainant. Because the names of the Panel members have
not been provided and are not on the CJC website, I cannot write to the Panel directly, and thus
am writing through you.
I would like an opportunity to make a submission with respect to the findings of former Justice
Tom Cromwell in a report produced for the University of Toronto, in which the extent of Justice
Spiro’s interventions were made clearer. I wish to offer observations as to how those findings
relate to the code of judicial ethics to which Justice Spiro is bound. In the course of the
submissions, I will attempt to demonstrate that Mr. Cromwell adopted an approach to
assessing evidence that falls far short of reliability and normative and inferential reasoning that
fails to sustain key conclusions he draws related to the appropriateness and impact of Justice
Spiro’s conduct.
I say this with much respect to Mr. Cromwell -- who taught me the Law of Evidence – but it
would be a serious problem if the Review Panel were to somehow take his reasoning and
conclusions as a starting point, an even more serious problem were they to be endorsed by the
Panel, and a major mistake were the Cromwell report to cause the Panel not to determine that
a public inquiry committee is required. For this reason, I hope that the Panel agrees to hear
from me.
I would appreciate an answer as immediately as possible.
Yours sincerely,
Craig Scott, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School
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From: info <info@cjc-ccm.ca>
Sent: April 6, 2021 2:20 PM
To: Craig Martin Scott <cscott@osgoode.yorku.ca>
Subject: RE: CJC File 20-0260

Dear Mr. Scott,
Thank you for writing to the Canadian Judicial Council (Council).
Your complaint was referred to the Honourable Kenneth G. Nielsen, Associate Chief
Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta and Vice Chairperson of the Judicial
Conduct Committee of the Canadian Judicial Council. Associate Chief Justice Nielsen
has determined that the matter should be referred to a Review Panel.
In accordance with the Canadian Judicial Council Inquiries and Investigations Bylaws 2015 (“By-laws”), the “senior member” of the Judicial Conduct Committee, Chief
Justice G.D. Joyal has designated the five members of the Review Panel who will review
this matter.
Once the Review Panel has reviewed this matter, Council will advise you accordingly.
I trust this will be of assistance to you.
Yours sincerely,
Josée Gauthier
Registry Officer /
Greffière
Canadian Judicial Council /
Conseil canadien de la magistrature
Tel: 613-288-1566
From: Craig Martin Scott <cscott@osgoode.yorku.ca>
Sent: Monday, April 5, 2021 7:00 PM
To: info <info@cjc-ccm.ca>
Subject: RE: CJC File 20-0260
Hello again,
As six months (referenced in the email below) has passed, I just wanted to check whether I should be in
receipt of any further communications from the CJC with regard to CJC File: 20-0260?
Yours sincerely,
Craig
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ANNEX C

Letter from Acting Executive Director of the Canadian Judicial Council to Craig
Scott

Dated May 20, 2021; sent May 21, 2021

Letter conveying disposition of CJC File: 20-0260 (Justice David Spiro)

Personal and Confidential
CJC File: 20-0260
May 20, 2021

Mr. Craig Scott
By email: CScott@osgoode.yorku.ca

Dear Mr. Scott:
I am responding to your emails of September 20 and 25, 2020 and April 20 and 22, 2021 in
which you make a complaint in respect of the Honourable David E. Spiro of the Tax Court
of Canada (the Tax Court).
In your correspondence to the Canadian Judicial Council (Council), you complain about the
alleged interference of Justice Spiro in the appointment process in relation to the Director
of the International Human Rights Program (IHRP) of the Faculty of Law (the Faculty), of
the University of Toronto (the University). The conduct of Justice Spiro is alleged to put
the integrity and impartiality of the Tax Court in jeopardy, and cause any party or lawyer
before the Tax Court who is Palestinian, Arab, or Muslim to reasonably fear bias.
The mandate of Council in matters of judicial conduct is to determine whether a
recommendation should be made to the Minister of Justice, after a formal investigation,
that a judge be removed from office by Parliament. The reasons for removal are set out in
the Judges Act and address situations in which a judge has become incapacitated or
disabled from performing the duties of a judge. This can be as a result of age or infirmity,
misconduct, a failure to execute the duties of the position, or being in a position
incompatible with the functions of a judge. In certain cases, Council may recommend
remedial measures or express concern about a judge’s conduct.
In accordance with the Review Procedures of Council, your correspondence was referred to
the Honourable Kenneth G. Nielsen, Associate Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench
of Alberta and Vice-Chair of the Judicial Conduct Committee. Upon review, Associate
Chief Justice Nielsen referred your complaint and other related complaints to a Judicial
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-2Conduct Review Panel (the Review Panel) for consideration. The Review Panel has now
completed its review.
Section 4 of the Canadian Judicial Council Inquiries and Investigations By-laws, 2015 (the
By-laws) provides that a Judicial Conduct Review Panel “may decide that an Inquiry
Committee is to be constituted only if it determines that the matter might be serious enough
to warrant removal of the judge.” The Review Panel in the matter of Justice Spiro
determined that the judge’s conduct was not such that it might be serious enough to warrant
his removal from office.
Before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro was a member of the Board of
Directors at the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA). On September 3, 2020, Justice
Spiro learned from a staff member of CIJA about the appointment or imminent
appointment of Dr Azarova as the Director of IHRP, and of concerns about her academic
work and position on Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territory. Justice Spiro was
asked whether he could approach the Dean of the Faculty to relay these concerns, and if he
could determine whether the appointment had been made.
Justice Spiro declined to approach the Dean of the Faculty as he found it to be
inappropriate. He had made arrangements earlier for a “telephone catch-up” on the
following day with an official from the University. During their conversation, Justice Spiro
mentioned the potential appointment of Dr Azarova as the Director of IHRP and
commented about the controversial nature of this appointment from the perspective of the
Jewish community and the potential damage to the reputation of the University. He sought
information about whether the candidate had been appointed as yet. Justice Spiro did not
contact the Dean of the Faculty, and specifically declined to approach him.
Throughout the years and before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro had been a
very engaged alumnus who supported the Faculty financially and professionally and who
had been active in fundraising campaigns. For the Review Panel, it was this background as
distinct from the judge’s judicial position that prompted Justice Spiro’s discussion with the
official from the University. The Review Panel was of the view that Justice Spiro was
voicing his concerns about the potential impact of the appointment and associated
controversy on the University and the Faculty, as opposed to actively campaigning or
lobbying against Dr Azarova’s appointment. Part of Justice Spiro’s concern was whether
the University had done its due diligence in its selection process.
Before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro devoted a great deal of time to
enhance his understanding of the Israel-Palestine conflict and to build bridges between the

-3parties and the faith communities involved. He stated “I do not harbour any views that are
anti-Palestine, anti-Palestinian, anti-Arab, or anti-Muslim.” The Review Panel concluded
that nothing in the career of Justice Spiro or his work supports the suggestion of perceived
bias on his part against Palestinian, Arab or Muslim interests.
The Review Panel concluded that right thinking persons apprised in accurate terms of the
conduct of Justice Spiro over his career and in relation to this matter could not conclude
that the judge is biased against Palestinian, Arab or Muslim interests. The fear of bias on
the part of Justice Spiro is based on misinformation and speculation that is inaccurate. The
fear of bias in the future is not well-founded and cannot form the basis for directing the
constitution of an Inquiry Committee.
The Review Panel found that it was an error for Justice Spiro to raise such concerns in the
manner he did. The judge properly recognized the mistakes he made and expressed
remorse. The Review Panel found this error serious but in the end, it was not such as to
warrant removal of Justice Spiro from office.
Section 2(5) of the By-laws specifies that if the Review Panel decides that no Inquiry
Committee is to be constituted, it must send the matter back to the Vice-Chairperson of the
Judicial Conduct Committee to make a decision on the most appropriate way to resolve the
matter.
Associate Chief Justice Nielsen considered the circumstances of this case. Justice Spiro
acknowledged his mistakes and expressed remorse. In a letter to Council dated October 26,
2020, Justice Spiro wrote it was a mistake for him to discuss such a controversial matter
with an official of the University, which he deeply regrets. Justice Spiro acknowledged that
his conduct raised questions about his commitment to impartiality toward all litigants and
counsel who appear before him. He stated he learned that words spoken outside the
courtroom by a judge may create the wrong impression about the judge’s integrity and
impartiality.
Judges should strive to ensure that their conduct, both in and out of Court, will sustain and
contribute to public respect and confidence in their integrity, impartiality and judgment,
and thereby contribute to confidence in the administration of justice. It was a serious error
for Justice Spiro to discuss the appointment of the Director of IHRP, one that he regrets and
that he states he has learned from.
Associate Chief Justice Nielsen has expressed concerns to Justice Spiro as to his conduct in
this matter.

-4In view of all of the circumstances, Associate Chief Justice Nielsen is satisfied that Justice
Spiro is acutely aware of his duty to the public, as a judge, to not only ensure he is
impartial, but to be seen as being impartial. In the light of the above, Associate Chief
Justice Nielsen instructed me to close this complaint. He thanks you for raising your
concerns with Council.
On April 22, 2021, you forwarded submissions to the Review Panel concerning your
complaint and the Cromwell Report. On that date, the Review Panel had already made its
determination in this matter. The Review Procedures and the By-laws do not provide an
opportunity for a complainant to make submissions to a Review Panel, and Review Panels
do not seek such submissions. Nevertheless, Associate Chief Justice Nielsen commented he
did review your submissions of April 22, 2021 when making his decision on the most
appropriate way to resolve this complaint.

Yours sincerely,

Jacqueline Corado
Acting Executive Director

ANNEX D

Canadian Judicial Council, Press Release

May 21, 2021

“Canadian Judicial Council completes its review of the matter involving the
Honourable D.E. Spiro”

https://cjc-ccm.ca/en/news/canadian-judicial-council-completes-review-matter-involving-honourable-de-spiro

Press Releases
Ottawa, May 21 2021

Canadian Judicial Council completes its
review of the matter involving the
Honourable D.E. Spiro
Canadian Judicial Council
A Judicial Conduct Review Panel, constituted by the Canadian Judicial Council to review a
matter involving the Honourable David E. Spiro, has concluded that while the judge made
serious mistakes, these were not serious enough to warrant a recommendation for his removal
from office.
The Review Panel was constituted at the direction of the Honourable Kenneth Nielsen, Associate
Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta and Vice-Chair of the Judicial Conduct
Committee, following complaints filed with the Council relating to Justice Spiro’s alleged
interference in the appointment of a Director of the International Human Rights Program (IHRP)
of the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto. The conduct of Justice Spiro was alleged to
have put the integrity and impartiality of the Tax Court of Canada in jeopardy, and cause any
party or lawyer before the Court who is Palestinian, Arab, or Muslim to reasonably fear bias.
The Review Panel was comprised of Chief Justice Robert Bauman (Chairperson), Chief Justice
Martel D. Popescul, Chief Justice Manon Savard, Justice Denis Jacques, and Dr. Jennifer N.
Davis, Ph.D. In arriving at their conclusions, the Panel reviewed Justice Spiro’s response to the
complaints, various letters of support received, and the report produced by former Justice
Thomas Cromwell for the University of Toronto.
The Panel noted that before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro was a member of the
Board of Directors at the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA). On September 3, 2020,
Justice Spiro learned from a staff member of CIJA about the imminent appointment of a person
as Director of IHRP, and of related concerns. Justice Spiro was asked whether he could approach
the Dean of the Faculty to relay these concerns.
Justice Spiro specifically declined to approach the Dean of the Faculty as he found it to be
inappropriate. He had made arrangements earlier for a general “telephone catch-up” on the
following day with an official and friend from the University. During their conversation, Justice
Spiro commented about the controversial nature of this appointment from the perspective of the
Jewish community and the potential damage to the reputation of the University.
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Throughout the years and before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro had been a very
engaged alumnus who supported the Faculty financially and professionally. For the Review
Panel, it was this background, as distinct from the judge’s judicial position, that prompted Justice
Spiro’s discussion with the official from the University. The Review Panel was of the view that
Justice Spiro was voicing his concerns about the potential impact of the appointment and
associated controversy on the University and the Faculty, as opposed to actively campaigning or
lobbying against the appointment. Part of Justice Spiro’s concern was whether the University had
done its due diligence in its selection process.
Before his appointment to the judiciary, Justice Spiro devoted a great deal of time to enhance his
understanding of the Israel-Palestine conflict and to build bridges between the parties and the
faith communities involved. The Review Panel concluded that nothing in the career of Justice
Spiro or his work supports the suggestion of perceived bias on his part against Palestinian, Arab
or Muslim interests.
The Review Panel concluded that reasonable persons apprised in accurate terms of the conduct
of Justice Spiro over his career and in relation to this matter could not conclude that the judge is
biased against Palestinian, Arab or Muslim interests. The fear of bias on the part of Justice Spiro
is based on misinformation and speculation that is inaccurate. Further, the Panel observed that
any fear of bias in the future is not well-founded and cannot form the basis for directing the
constitution of an Inquiry Committee.
The Review Panel did find, however, that it was an error for Justice Spiro to raise such concerns
in the manner he did. The judge properly recognized the mistakes he made and expressed
remorse. The Review Panel found this error serious but that it did not warrant removal of Justice
Spiro from office.
Associate Chief Justice Nielsen considered all the circumstances of this case, including Justice
Spiro’s remorse and acknowledgment that his conduct raised questions about his commitment to
impartiality toward all litigants and counsel who appear before him.
Judges should strive to ensure that their conduct, both in and out of Court, will sustain and
contribute to public respect and confidence in their integrity, impartiality and judgment, and
thereby contribute to confidence in the administration of justice. It was a serious error for Justice
Spiro to discuss the appointment of the Director of IHRP, one that he regrets and one from which
he states he has learned.
Associate Chief Justice Nielsen has expressed concerns to Justice Spiro as to his conduct in this
matter. In view of all of the circumstances, Associate Chief Justice Nielsen is satisfied that
Justice Spiro is acutely aware of his duty to the public, as a judge, to not only ensure he is
impartial, but to be seen as being impartial. In light of the above, Associate Chief Justice Nielsen
directed that the matter be closed.
Contact:
Johanna Laporte Director of Communications info@cjc-ccm.ca
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